Username E Password Sky Go Crack 11 PORTABLE
Username E Password Sky Go Crack 11
an additional problem with a hash of all possible passwords is that some of them are too much work. for example, a total of 247 possible passwords of 11 characters is enough to fill a 4 gigabyte buffer. a password lists that size in its entirety would occupy an internet hard disk. this problem is called the butterfly effect: the first step toward solving the problem is to get rid of some possible passwords so that the remaining candidates are more likely to be short, such as mypassword, or to be unique, such as meditateoncracks. there are heuristics that can be applied to limit the search space, such as only searching for possible passwords that have the same first letter of a word.
collision attacks may also make it possible to crack a hash of all possible passwords. a collision attack is one in which it is possible to produce two different input vectors that produce the same hash. you may know that a collision attack works by trying a large number of random inputs until one works (similar to filling the data lake of all possible passwords). a hash function cannot be made to produce two different outputs from two different inputs, but it may be possible to create a series of inputs that produce the same hash multiple times. for example, if a candidate hash is h(p1p1s1s1p2s2s2s2), once a solution has been found, it is very likely that it could find a second solution by multiplying the solution by its last character.
a hash function that is exposed to output that is easy to predict is called a poor hash function. a poor hash function makes it possible to distinguish between two sets of data that are effectively identical. for example, using a poor hash function, its possible to determine the lottery number of each attendee in a companywide lottery, as knowing how the hash of the number of attendee is related to the number of attendee gives an attacker the ability to match a known hash against the hash of a different list of attendees.
this attack also occurs when the web server accesses the username/fingerprint pair, rather than the original password. this is very common, even when the system has salting in place. for example, if the server is checking for a username/fingerprint pair and the username is “bob” it will retrieve “bob0958” from its database. this results in the following:
in this case, the salt “bar” is added to the original “xxx”. the attacker then has an sha-1 hash for which he has the original password and a second hash for which he has the original salt but does not have the original password. the attacker then attacks the original sha-1 hash and the original salt and from this data, he calculates two new hashes (one using the stored password and salt, and one using the original salt and password). these two hashes together are then compared against the hashes in the database. this attack is possible because the salt is not required to be secret as it is by the md5 algorithm.
of course, one could use the original fingerprint too in this attack but that adds a bit more work. a better approach is to do exactly what the web site did: to try different salts until one of them gives the required hash. after testing multiple salts, an attacker could be confident that he has the correct one.
in order to be able to perform this attack the attacker must have access to the web site’s db. this means that the web site must store sensitive data in a database, and the database must be accessible to remote attackers.
fortunately, as the web server is merely returning its own fingerprint and salt, it is not necessary for the attacker to intercept the web traffic to the database. all he needs is the fingerprint and salt of a valid user.